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A tendency in biological theorizing is to formulate principles above or equal to Evolution by
Variation and Selection of Darwin and Wallace. In this letter I analyze one such recent proposal
which did so for the developmental ascendency. I show that though the idea of developmental
ascendency is brilliant, this is in wrong order in the hierarchical structure of biological theories and
can easily generate confusing. Several other examples are also briefly discussed in the note added.
Published version: Biological Theory 2(1) (2007) 113-115.
In a thoughtful essay Coffman (2006) argued for the
need of a general theoretical framework for developmen-
tal processes. He proposed that such a general theory,
which he named the developmental ascendency (DA), in-
deed exist. He further argued that such a theory may
supersede Darwinian evolutionary theory. While his first
part of argument appears convincing, his contention that
DA is superior to Darwinian evolution are in wrong the-
oretical order. It has been demonstrated recently (Ao
2005), though the main ideas were already in earlier sem-
inar works of Fisher (1930) and Wright (1932), that Dar-
winian evolution implies thermodynamics, therefore DA.
To the present author, such a mixed-up is not acciden-
tal: It reflects a conceptual defect in the understanding
of Darwinian evolution persistent to these days ever since
neo-Darwinism. The purpose of the present letter is to
point out and to clarify this misunderstanding.
There are two profound and quantitative concepts em-
bedded in Darwinian evolutionary theory (Fisher 1930;
Wright 1932; Ao 2005). The first is Fisher’s fundamen-
tal theorem of natural selection (FTNS), which links the
variation and stochasticity to the ability of a system seek-
ing best places in its enormous functional space during
its evolution. This intrinsic dynamical concept was ini-
tially formulated within the context of population ge-
netics more than 70 years ago. Since then, its role has
been found in all biological processes in which develop-
mental processes are special cases. Its counter-part in
physical sciences is the so-called fluctuation-dissipation
theorem (Ma 1985), one of the most important theorems
in modern physics, associated with great names such as
Einstein. The second fundamental concept is equally im-
portant, known as Wright’s adaptive landscape, again
proposed more than 70 years ago. It describes the pos-
sible final selection to which the system to evolve. Its
physical science counter-part is the potential energy or
Hamiltonian (Ao 2005), the very quantity needed in any
dynamical discussion in physics. Following Darwinian
evolutionary theory, with the aid of FTNS and adap-
tive landscape, it has been demonstrated mathematically
that thermodynamics is determined by Wright potential
function in Darwinian dynamics (Ao 2005, 2006). As
argued by Coffman, DA is implied in the thermodynam-
ics. Therefore, these two logic relations imply that DA
is a special case of Darwinian evolutionary theory. This
would have already been suggested by the very terminolo-
gies associated with those general theories: Thermody-
namics means no dynamics, because it only concerns with
equilibrium or steady state processes; On the other hand,
Darwinian evolutionary theory is an explicit nonequilib-
rium dynamical theory. The description of the mathe-
matical structure embedded in its final steady state is
thermodynamics.
Logically I have now reached the end of my reasoning:
It have been demonstrated that Darwinian evolutionary
dynamics implies DA, not the other way. Nevertheless, it
is not so simple in reality. Let me further address a few
more specific and interesting issues raised in Coffman’s
essay to make my point more clear.
Acceptance of adaptive landscape in biology. In
the Abstract his essay Coffman acknowledged that the
general idea of his DA was already implied in a some-
what ignored Ulanowicz’s ascendency theory in ecology
(Ulanowicz 1980). In text he discussed a few reasons for
such neglecting, which are very plausible. Here I would
add two more reasons. The first lies in the mathematics.
Until recent, there was no general mathematical frame-
work to accommodate Wright’s adaptive landscape in a
generic nonequilibirum setting. A detailed mathematical
discussion is beyond the present letter. Relevant litera-
ture can be found elsewhere (Ao 2005, 2006).
The second additional reason is biological. Ever since
the formulation of neo-Darwinism, Fisher’s FTNS and
Wright’s adaptive landscape had not been fully under-
stood and had been controversial. Those misunderstand-
ings had been summarized by Gould (2002), a book cited
in favor in Coffman’s essay. While Gould’s criticism on
neo-Darwinism may be valid, he had no good reason
to dismiss those two quantitative concepts as violating
contingency, individuality, and interaction, three ideas
central in Darwinian evolutionary theory. It has been
shown that after clarifying the imprecise statements asso-
ciated with the original formulations, Fisher’s FTNS and
Wright’s adaptive landscape are indeed consistent with
those three central ideas in evolution (Ao 2005). Fur-
thermore, Gould’s dismissing appears rather odd view-
ing from the punctuated equilibrium theory which Gould
himself helped to establish: It is now known that Fisher’s
FTNS and Wright’s adaptive landscape actually provide
a sound theoretical and quantitative foundation to dis-
2cuss punctuated equilibrium.
If such confusions were not clarified, it would be likely
that Coffman’s DA would suffer the same fate as that of
Ulanowicz’s.
Natural selection vs autocatalytic cycle. Coff-
man suggested that ”natural selection is an emergent
property of autocatalytic cycles”. Again, this is in wrong
order. First of all, it has been universally accepted that
at its beginning there did not exist such cycles on Earth.
A complete discussion of this issue would go into philo-
sophical issues regarding to teleological reasoning beyond
my letter. Suffice it to say that natural selection gives
arise to the autocatalytic cycles and the variation is the
source of innovation and creation. Without variation, we
would be in a deterministic world, a perspective rightly
argued against by Coffman. Once such cycles are fixed by
selection, or, borrowing the language from Waddington
(1959), are canalized, it provides the adaptive landscape
for further evolution and, concomitantly, for further se-
lection.
Such dynamical phenomena suggest that Darwinian
evolutionary theory has essentially two parts: the dy-
namical structure encoded in evolution by selection and
variation, further classified into four dynamical elements
by following ideas of Fisher and Wright (Ao 2005, 2006);
and the structure of each dynamical element in a given
biological process. Same classification of two types of
fundamental laws in biology has also been proposed re-
cently from a completely different perspective (Wilson
2006). Today it should be evident that Darwin and Wal-
lace (Darwin 1958; Darwin and Wallace 1858) got the
dynamical part completely correct nearly 150 years ago.
Since then, this dynamical part has been demonstrated
to be independent of specific biological instantiation and
has been applied to biological processes ranging from
gene regulation, metabolic pathways, ecology, cognitive
science, etc (Wilson 2006). This dynamical part of evo-
lutionary theory is sufficient to give arise to the develop-
mental ascendency as reasoned above. Nevertheless, it is
also well known that Darwin and Wallace did not get the
structures of dynamical elements for the heretic process
correct, among others: Mendel’s theory was unknown to
them. Clearly, we too have not completely understood
all structures of all dynamical elements, such as those in
developmental processes. The desire to understand such
structures has been one of major driving forces in modern
biological and medical research.
Coffman pointed out that the gene regulation is an
example to illustrate his DA, with both positive and
negative feedbacks, abundant in developmental processes
(Davidson 2006), with which I completely agree. I wish
to further point out that Darwinian dynamics exem-
plified by adaptive landscape and stochastic force has
been quantitatively used in the modelling a gene regula-
tory network, the lambda genetic switch formed by both
positive and negative feedbacks (Ptashne 2004), where
the dynamical elements are determined by the Jacob-
Monod operon theory constraint by physical and chem-
ical laws. It has now achieved quantitative agreement
between the theory and experiments and with further
predictions (Zhu et al 2004). There has been a contin-
uous progress in the experimental determination of the
gene regulatory structure in the complex developmental
processes such as that of sea urchins (Davidson 2006).
It is conceivable that a biological theory similar to that
of Jacob-Monod to specify the dynamical elements may
soon be available and that a quantitative and predica-
tive Darwinian dynamics study of such complex develop-
mental processes may be readily carried out in various
theoretical/computational labs. This may be regarded
as an explicit example for the universality of Darwinian
dynamics.
Darwin and Einstein. Coffman correctly observed
that ”Einstein’s general theory of relativity contextual-
izes Newtonian physics”. However, above analysis shows
that the same logic cannot be applied to DA with regard
to Darwinian evolutionary theory. Einstein had deeply
modified the dynamical structure of Newtonian dynam-
ics. DA has not changed, and will not change in my
opinion, the structure of Darwinian dynamics. The four
dynamical elements of Darwinian dynamics has already
appeared to be what needed in the mathematical mod-
elling of developmental processes. Darwin and Wallace’s
word equation,
Evolution by Variation and Selection,
remains its supreme position in biology. It may even help
physicists to solve some of their own difficult problems,
as having been trying. Darwinian dynamics implies de-
velopmental ascendency, not the other way.
Note added, Aug. 6 (2007). An interesting article in
New York Times a week ago16 promoted the coopera-
tion theory (CT), where CT was placed as equal to the
Evolution by Variation and Selection. Given above anal-
ysis, this still appears a little uneven: CT is only one of
many realizations of Darwinian dynamics. Let me elabo-
rate this point further below, because it strengthens the
argument in the text.
As already discussed1,13, there are two types funda-
mental laws. One is of course the dynamical laws embed-
ded in Evolution by Variation and Selection. The other
is its realization, which is arguably best represented by
the theory of Mendel-Watson-Crick, at least for what we
have known so far on Earth. The advancement in human
understanding of Nature may generate (artificial) life not
bounded by DNA and RNA in the future. For many bi-
ological studies, the Mendel-Watson-Crick theory is too
fundamental to be convenient. More effective theories at
given phenomenological levels should be, and have been,
developed. The theory of developmental ascendency3 is
such an example. The well known self-organization the-
ory (SOT) is another realization17, and CT appears to a
special case of SOT. Let’s grant CT’s independence from
SOT to simplify the presentation. Both CT and SOT
3have broad explanatory power. For example, they may
explain the origin of religions, and, both CT and SOT,
and possibly others, are ”everywhere in evolution where
interesting things are happening”. Still, CT is one real-
ization of Evolution by Variation and Selection, not ”one
of the three basic principles of evolution. The other two
are mutation and selection.” The upshot is that, search
for appropriate effective biological theories in the frame-
work of Darwin and Wallace was one of the central tasks
in last century. It will remain so in this century.
1 Ao P (2005) Laws in Darwinian evolutionary theory,




2 Ao P (2006) Nonequilibrium statistical mechanics, steady






3 Coffman JA (2006) Developmental ascendency: from
bottom-up to top-down control. Biological Theory 1: 165-
178.
4 Darwin C (1958) On the Origin of Species by Means of
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races
in the Struggle for Life. Penguin, New York.
5 Darwin C and Wallace A (1858) On the tendency of species
to form varieties; and on the perpetuation of varieties and
species by natural means of selection. Journal of the Pro-
ceedings of the Linnean Society of London, Zoology 3: 45-
62.
6 Davidson EH (2006) The Regulatory Genome: gene regu-
latory networks in development and evolution. Academic,
Oxford.
7 Fisher RA (1930) The Genetical Theory of Natural Selec-
tion. Clarendon, Oxford.
8 Gould SJ (2002) The Structure of Evolutionary Theory.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
9 Ma SK (1985) Statitical Mechanics. World Scientific, Sin-
gapore.
10 Ptashne M (2004) A Genetic Switch: Phage λ revisited,
3rd edition. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, Cold
Spring Harbor.
11 Ulanowicz RE (1980) A hypothesis of the development of
natural communities. J. Theor. Biol. 85: 223-245.
12 Waddington CH (1959) Canalization of development and
gene assimilation of acquured characters. Nature 183:
1654-1655.
13 Wilson EO (2006) Creation: an appeal to save life on
Earth. Norton, New York.
14 Wright S (1932) The roles of mutation, inbreeding, cross-
breeding and selection in evolution. Proceedings of the
Sixth International Congress of Genetics. 1: 356-366.
15 Zhu XM, Yin L, Hood L, and Ao P (2004) Calculating
biological behaviors of epigenetic states in the phage λ life
cycle, Func. Integr. Genomics 4: 188-195.
16 Zimmer, C (2007) In games, an insight into the rules of
evolution. New York Times, July 31, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31/science/31prof.html,
accessed August 6, (2007).
17 Sole, RV and Goodwin, BC (2000) Signs of Life: how com-
plexity pervades biology (Basic Books, New York)
18 Published version:
P. Ao, Darwinian Dynamics Implies Developmental
Ascendency. Biological Theories 2 (2007) 113-115.
doi:10.1162/biot.2007.2.1.113
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs
/10.1162/biot.2007.2.1.113
